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The history of sovereign immunity in the United States is a
history of mistakes.
-Susan Randa11 1
[W]e must confront-yet again-the Feres doctrine . . . . We
conclude that this suit falls within the doctrine's
ever-expanding reach. We reach this conclusion only
reluctantly, bound by circuit precedent to apply this doctrine
to yet another case that seems far removed from its original
purposes.
- Costo v. United States2
INTRODUCTION

Through the application of the judicially created Feres doctrine,
female service members who suffer injuries during pregnancy or the
birthing process as a result of military medical malpractice are barred
from seeking recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and,
depending on the jurisdiction in which the negligent medical treatment

*
Tara Willke is an Assistant Professor at Duquesne University School of
Law and a veteran of the United States Air Force. She would like to thank her research
assistant, Emma Donahey, for all of her assistance. Additionally, she would like to
thank her family and colleagues for their invaluable support and encouragement.
1.
Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L.
REv. 1, 2 (2002).
2.
248 F.3d 863, 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
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occurs, their children may also be barred from seeking recovery for the
injuries they sustain as the result of the negligent prenatal medical care.
The Feres doctrine spawned from the United States government's
passage of the FTCA in 1946, which was intended to be a broad waiver
of the government's sovereign immunity. 3 Pursuant to the FTCA, the
government could be held liable for torts committed by its employees. 4
The FTCA contains certain exceptions to this general waiver but never
did, and currently does not, explicitly bar service members from
bringing suit for injuries they sustain during their military service that
do not fall within one of the enumerated exceptions. 5
In 1950, however, the United States Supreme Court, in Feres v.
United States, 6 held that service members were barred from bringing
claims pursuant to the FTCA if the injury to the service member
occurred "incident to service. " 7 The "incident to service" test is not
tied to any one of the enumerated exceptions in the FTCA and is, thus,
an exception created by the Court. Federal courts have tried to apply
this test and have struggled to determine when an injury occurs
"incident to service," and injuries have been found to occur incident to
service simply if the service member was on active duty at the time of
the injury, regardless of whether the injury resulted from the service
member's military duties. 8
Thus, in cases involving claims brought by female service
members for injuries suffered during their pregnancies or births as the
result of military medical malpractice, courts have, with very little
discussion or rationalization, held that the injuries occurred "incident to
service" and are barred by the Feres doctrine. 9 The child's claim may
also be barred under the theory that it derived from the mother's injury
and is barred because the mother's injury is barred.

3.
4.

5.

See infra Part IT.
See infra Part ll.
See infra Part IT.

u.s.

6.
340
135 (1950).
7.
ld. at 146.
For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "[t)he
8.
dispositive inquiry [is] whether the service-member stand[s] in the type of relationship
to the military at the time of his or her injury that the occurrences causing the injury
arose out of activity incident to military service." Purcell v. United States, 656 F.3d
463, 466 (7th Cir. 2011). Under this test, the Seventh Circuit bas held that when a
service member commits suicide on base during non-working hours, the injury arises
out of an activity that was incident to service. ld. at 466-67.
9.
See infra Part III.
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In an earlier essay, I address the "incident to service" test as it
applies to the pre-birth cases. 10 After reviewing the history of women in
the military and the unique treatment the military affords pregnant
service members, in that essay I argue that pregnancy and any injuries
sustained incident thereto cannot be considered occurring "incident to
service" and should not be barred by the Feres doctrine. 11 In reviewing
the pre-birth injury claims brought by female service members, I was
surprised to fmd that their claims were being dismissed rather
summarily, with very little, if any, discussion regarding how the claims
undermined the rationales the Court outlined as underpinning the Feres
doctrine. 12 If the woman was in the military when the injury occurred
during pregnancy, her injury was barred, end of discussion.
In an effort to understand the force behind the perfunctory nature
of the dismissals, my research led me to the doctrine of federal
sovereign immunity. The Feres doctrine is, after al1 , grounded in the
concept of sovereign immunity. The current application of the doctrine
of federal sovereign immunity is that the government cannot be subject
to suit unless it consents, regardless of whether the lawsuit implicates
government policy decisions. In other words, immunity is available just
because the government is a sovereign. The Supreme Court subscribes
to this view. Whether the government should be able to claim unbridled
immunity is, however, far from settled, but there are sound reasons for
allowing the government to claim immunity for policy decisions that
affect the public at large. 13
In examining the pre-birth injury cases brought by female se.rvice
members and the current application of the Feres doctrine, I have
reached the conclusion that even though the Court outlined broad policy
rationales supporting the existence of the doctrine, in application of the
doctrine to pre-birth cases, the doctrine mirrors the current mistaken
application of sovereign immunity in general and provides a virtual
blanket form of immunity. 14 Stated differently, in order to invoke the

10.
Tara Willke, Military Mothers and Claims Under the Federal Tort Claims
Act for Injuries that Occur Pre-Birth, 91 NoTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 160 (2016) .
11.
Id. at 165- 68.

12.
/d. at 167- 68.
13.
E.g., Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity , 45 VAND.
L. REv. 1529, 1534-41 (1992); see Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift of Federal
Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 517, 522-25 (2008).
14.
The cases that form the basis of this essay are only one example of
instances where the doctrine has been applied without any meaningful review of
whether the policy rationales underlying the Peres doctrine are actually implicated. A
complete review of cases outside of the pre-birth context is beyond the scope of this
essay, but it is an issue that is, nonetheless, ripe for review and discussion.
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protection of the doctrine in FTCA cases brought by female service
members for injuries sustained pre-birth, the government is not
required to explain how any of the policy rationales enunciated by the
Court for the doctrine are implicated by the female service member's
claim. This is a mistake that is based on the mistaken belief that
sovereign immunity has no boundaries or limits.
Thus, in Part I, I examine the doctrine of federal sovereign
immunity and outline the competing theories regarding the existence of
and purposes for the doctrine at the federal level. The federal
government has operated under the assumption that unless it waives its
immunity, it cannot be subject to suit. Part II provides a targeted
overview of the FfCA and the Feres doctrine, focusing on the policy
rationales enunciated by the Supreme Court for the creation of the
doctrine. The pre-birth injury cases are just one example of how the
expansive view of sovereign immunity has been applied to members of
the military, and these cases are discussed in Part III.
Finally, in Part IV, I argue that Congress must reassert itself in
this issue because, ultimately, whether the FTCA bars claims by female
service members for injuries sustained pre-birth as the result of medical
malpractice and the broader issue of whether the Feres doctrine should
be used to bar similar claims is a policy determination that must be
addressed by Congress. If Congress continues to allow the status quo to
prevail, then courts addressing claims brought by service members
under the FTCA should acknowledge that the concept of sovereign
immunity embodied in the applica_tion of the Feres doctrine has been
taken too far and conduct a meaningful review of the claims to
determine if they undermine the rationales enunciated by the Court for
the creation of the doctrine. In the cases involving injuries to service
women and their children pre-birth, this will lead to the conclusion that
these are not the types of claims that should be barred by the Feres
doctrine.
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The concept of sovereign immunity is commonly traced to the
British monarchy, where the King was not to be called into court
without his consent. 15 Under the British theory of sovereign immunity,
British subjects could only seek a petition of right to address claims

15.
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882). See generally Randall,
supra note 1, at 14-16; Marc L. Roark, Retelling English Sovereignty, 4 BRIT. J. AM.
LEGAL STUD.

81 , 83-84 (2015).
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against the monarchy. 16 Under its current application in this country,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity provides the federal government
with immunity from lawsuits unless the government consents to being
sued. Even though there is almost widespread agreement that the
Constitution does not explicitly grant the federal government immunity
from lawsuits, 17 there is disagreement regarding whether the doctrine
should exist in a democratic republic. 18 Proponents of the doctrine
argue that it exists without an explicit gram in the Constitution. 19
Opponents argue that the doctrine conflicts with democracy and has no
role in a government where the people are the sovereign. 20 Others fmd
that there are reasons for the doctrine's existence, but there is also
acknowledgement that, as currently applied, the doctrine's application
has been taken far beyond what is necessary to honor the doctrine's
logical purposes. 21
There is a valid argument that " [s]overeign immunity is a
judge-made doctrine in its very origins. " 22 In the Supreme Court's early
jurisprudence regarding the existence of the doctrine in the new
republic, as early as 1821, the Court acknowledged in dicta that the
doctrine existed, 23 but it also acknowledged that "the principle has

16.
Lee, 106 U.S. at 205.
17.
E.g. , Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty,
Imnumity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. lNT'L L. REv. 521, 523 (2003);
see also Fred 0. Smith, Jr., Awakening the People's Giant: Sovereign Immunity and
the Constitution's Republican Commitment, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 1941, 1943-50
(2012) (discussing the Guarantee Clause and its interplay with the doctrine of sovereign
immunity). But see Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsb, The Appropriations Power and
Sovereign Immunity , 107 MICH . L. REv. 1207, 1264-67 (2009) (discussing the
Appropriations Clause as a source of immunity for claims for money damages).
18.
E.g. , Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1425, 1435 (1987) (discussing who was to be the "ultimate unlimited sovereign" and
ftnding that early Americans believed that "[t]rue sovereignty resided in the People
themselves").
19.
E.g. , Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our LAw of Sovereign lmnumity, 42 B.C.
L. REv. 485, 488- 89 (2001).
20.
E.g. , Erwin Cbermerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L.
REv. 1201, 1201-03 (2001) .
21.
E.g., Jackson, supra note 17, at 522-27.
Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity's Penumbras: Common LAw,
22.
"Accident, n and Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE
FOREST L. REv . 765, 767 (2008); see also Sarah L. Briton, Three-Dimensional
Sovereign Immunity, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 237, 242 (2014).
23.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 264, 411 - 12 (1821) ("The
universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against
the United States . . . . "); accord United States v. M'Lemore, 45 U.S. (1 How.) 286,
288 (1846) ("[T]he government is not liable to be sued, except with its own consent,
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never been discussed or the reasons for it given. "24 More recently, in
Alden v. Maine, 25 which involved state sovereign immunity, the Court
reviewed the doctrine's history, stating that "the doctrine that a
sovereign could not be sued without its consent was universal in the
States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified. "26 According to
the Court, ratification of the Constitution did not alter that
understanding. 27 Thus, the doctrine was rooted in the belief that all
governments were immune from suit and the only way for the
sovereign to be subject to suit was if it consented thereto.28
Others who support the existence of the doctrine have articulated
theories other than the theory articulated by the Court to support the
existence of the doctrine. One theory focuses on the government's need
to insulate itself from suit for the policy decisions that affect the public
at large "because open-ended and unconstrained access to the courts by
those who object to governmental policies or actions could undermine
effective governance by the people through an electoral majority. "29
Thus, the idea is that the policy decisions that the government makes
for the public at large should not be reviewed in court. 30 Instead, the
desirability of such decisions should be left to the electorate and the
political process. 31 Under this justification for sovereign immunity,
there is a recognition that not all government actions are subject to
immunity and government actions that are not tied to policy
determinations should not be protected by the doctrine. 32 Along those
same lines, a test for determining when the government is able to
invoke the protection of the doctrine has been proposed.33 It has two
criteria:

given by law.") . See generally Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal
Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REv. 439, 443-44 (2005).
24.
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882).
25.
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
26.
/d. at 715-16.
27.
See id. ("Tbe generation tbat designed and adopted our federal system
considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity .").
28.
Hill, supra note 19, at 489 ("[I]mmunity is an inberent attribute of
sovereignty, without regard to tbe form of government prevailing within tbe borders of
tbe particular sovereign.").
29.
Sisk, supra note 13, at 529-30; accord Krent, supra note 13, at 1532
("The doctrine of sovereign immunity permits Congress to determine when to rely on
tbe political process to safeguard majoritarian policy.").
30.
Sisk, supra note 13, at 529-30.
31.
Krent, supra note 13, at 1532.
32.
/d. at 1532-33; see also Sisk, supra note 13, at 529-30.
33.
Corey Brettschneider & David McNamee, Sovereign and State: A
Democratic Theory of Sovereign Immunity , 93 TEX. L. REv. 1229, 1235-36 (2015).

2016:263

Sovereign Immunity and the Peres Doctrine

269

First, the state must act "for the people" within a framework
that respects the rights of citizens and in which its powers are
limited so as to meet this need. Second, the state must act "by
the people" by deriving its power from the consent of the
governed through their representatives. 34
Both criteria must be met for the goverrunent to claim it is immune
from liability for its actions.35
Other justifications for the doctrine's existence are tied to the
public treasury. One theory is that the doctrine protects the public
treasury from excessive judgments. 36 Even under this theory, the
government should not be allowed to claim that the doctrine
automatically insulates it from liability. 37 Another similar theory
focuses on the relationship between the branches of the government and
the need for the courts to protect themselves from appearing weak. 38
The theory is that because the Constitution grants Congress the ability
to make appropriations, even if a court enters a judgment against the
United States, the court has no way to force the government to make
the payment. 39 Thus, "[a]sserting the constitutional provenance of the
sovereign immunity doctrine in a sense empowered the Court more
fully to control what remedies it would make available. ".w Professor
Vicki Jackson, who has articulated this theory, writes, "[T]o the extent
sovereign immunity can be understood as a form of early judicial
efforts to protect and secure judicial independence . . . its scope should
be reconsidered and narrowed (if the doctrine itself is not abolished). " 41
Opponents of the doctrine argue that it does not exist in a form of
government where sovereignty lies with the people. 42 Thus, in a
democratic republic, the concept of sovereign immunity is

34.
!d. at 1235.
35.
/d. at 1235- 36.
36.
Sisk, supra note 13, at 543.
37.
/d. at 562 ("It is quite another thing to allow lhe canon of strict
construction to devolve into a methodology by which the government wins
automatically whenever plausible arguments can be made for alternative interpretations
of a statutory provision that sets forth standards, limitations, exceptions, or procedural
rules for claims against the government already authorized by an express waiver.").
See Jackson, supra note 17, at 574-75.
38.
ld. at 574.
39.
40.
ld. at 604- 05.
ld. at 607.
41.
42.
Amar, supra note 18, at 1466 (no immunity for constitutional violations);
Chermerinsky. supra note 20, at 1203 (the doctrine "conflicts with too many basic
constitutional principles to survive"); Randall, supra note 1, at 3 ("LT]he federal
government . . . enjoys no constitutional immunity in Article ill cases.").
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"inconsistent" with the Constitution because it places the government
above the people. 43 Professor Susan Randall argues that this "mistake
has thwarted the administration of justice in this country over the
course of more than two centuries, depriving many claimants against
the United States . . . protection of our law. " 44 Examining similar
evidence used by the Court to find that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity survived ratification, Professor Randall agrees with the Court
that prior to ratification of the Constitution there was a general
understanding regarding the concept of sovereign immunity and the
ability of a sovereign to be immune from suit unless it consented, but
she argues that "the Founders understood ratification of the
Constitution to provide that consent. " 45
Thus, the exact reaches of federal sovereign immunity, if it exists
at all, are far from settled, and there are a number of reasonable, sound
arguments questioning the existence and reach of the doctrine. The
Court has, however, taken the position that the federal government
cannot be subject to suit unless it consents, and this is the assumption
under which Congress has operated. The next section addresses one of
the government's particular waivers of its immunity-the Federal Tort
Claims Act-and the Court's determination that this waiver was not
intended to apply to members of the military for injuries they sustained
"incident to service."

II.

THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE FERES DOCTRINE

Because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States
government was not subject to liability for torts caused by its
employees until the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)46 in
1946. The FTCA was Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act. 47
The purpose for the Legislative Reorganization Act was "[t]o provide
for increased efficiency in the legislative branch of the Government. " 48
43.
44.
45.
46.
47 .

Randall, supra note 1, at 15.
ld. at 6.
!d. at 30.
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 601 , 60 Stat. 812,

842.
ld. The passage of the FTCA was, according to some accounts, spurred
48.
by a B-24 bomber crash into the Empire State Building. Joe Richman, The Day a
Bomber Hit the Empire Stare Building, NPR (July 28, 2008), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=92987873. The Texas City Disaster of 1947, where
it was estimated that it was possible that up to six hundred people died after a French
ship carrying ammonium nitrate exploded, may have also helped trigger the passage of
the FTCA. Edward G. Babdi, A Look aJ the Feres Doctrine as It Applies to Medical

Sovereign Immunity and the Peres Doctrine
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Prior to the passage of the FTCA, in order for a private citizen to seek
relief for a tort caused by a government employee, the citizen had to
fmd a congressional sponsor to shepherd the claim through both houses
of Congress for ultimate approval by the President.49 Even though the
actual procedure was well established by the time the FTCA was
passed, the process was "remarkably inefficient" and time consuming. 50
The FTCA was considered a broad waiver of the United States'
sovereign immunity. 51 Pursuant to the FTCA, the United States became
liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances" 52 "for money darnages"53 for
damages to property and personal injury caused by "any employee of
the govenunent. " 54 When the FTCA was passed, it contained twelve
exceptions. 55 None of those twelve exceptions unambiguously barred
members of the military from bringing claims under the FfCA. There
are currently thirteen enumerated exceptions, including one for "[a]ny
claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval
forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war. " 56 The other two

Malpractice Lawsuits: Challenging the Notion Tho.t Suing the Government Will Result in
a Breakdown of Military Discipline, ARMY LAW., Nov. 2010, at 56, 57.
See generally Walter Gellhom & Louis Lauer, Congressional Settlement
49.
ojTort Claims Against the United Stares , 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1955).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

PAUL FIGLEY, A G UIDE TO THE FEDERAL TORT

CLAIMS ACT 6-7 (2012).

E.g., Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 2001).
28

u.s.c. § 2674 (2012).

/d. § 1346(b)(l).
/d.

55.
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 601, § 421 , 60 Stat.
812, 845-46.
56.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2012). The other enumerated exceptions are:
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the
exercise or perfonnance or the failure to exercise or perfonn a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission
of letters or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or
customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property
by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer,
except that the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title
apply to any claim based on injury or loss of goods, merchandise, or other
property, while in the possession of any officer of customs or excise or any
other law enforcement officer, if-
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exceptions that may be read as applying to members of the military are
those for claims arising in a foreign country and for the exercise of a
discretionary function. 57 As noted by one court shortly after the passage
of the FfCA, the legislative history regarding the enumerated
exceptions was "singularly barren" regarding the purpose behind each
one of the listed exceptions.58

(1) the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any
provision of Federal law providing for the forfeiture of property other
than as a sentence·imposed upon conviction of a criminal offense;
(2) the interest of the claimant was not forfeited;
(3) the interest of the claimant was not remitted or mitigated (if the
property was subject to forfeiture); and
(4) the claimant was not convicted of a crime for which the interest of
the claimant in the property was subject to forfeiture under a Federal
criminal forfeiture law .. [sic]
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by chapter 309 or 311 of title

46 relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States.
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the
Government in administering the provisions of sections 1- 31 of Title 50,
Appendix.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a
quarantine by the United States.

[(g) Repealed. Sept. 26, 1950, cb. 1049, § 13(5), 64 Stat. 1043.]
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided,
That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement
officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and
section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the
date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For
the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer"
means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute
searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or
by the regulation of the monetary system.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.

(I) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority.

(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company.
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal
intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives.
Id. § 2680(a)-(i), (k)-(n).
57.
/d. § 2680(a), (k).
Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 769 (9th Cir. 1948).
58.
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In 1949, the United States Supreme Court, in Brooks v. United
States, 59 first addressed whether recovery under the FTCA was
available for members of the military for instances not covered by the
exceptions in the statute-although the plain language of the FTCA
appeared to allow such claims unless one of the enumerated exceptions
applied. In Brooks, two brothers, who also happened to be members of
the military, were hit by a vehicle driven by a goverrunent employee
while the brothers were on furlough. 60 One of the brothers died, and the
other was injured.61 When claims by the surviving brother and the
estate of the deceased brother were brought under the FTCA, the
goverrunent sought to have them dismissed because the brothers were
on active duty at the time of the accident. 62 The district court denied the
motion, but the appeals court reversed.63
In a relatively short opinion, the Court affrrmed, fmding that the
statute provided district courts with jurisdiction over "any claim" and
stated that "it would be absurd to believe that Congress did not have the
servicemen in mind in 1946, when this statute was passed. " 64 The
Court then discussed the versions of the tort claims bills that were
introduced before the FTCA was passed, and it found that of the
eighteen introduced between 1925 and 1935, sixteen contained
exceptions for claims brought by members of the military. 65 When the
version that ultimately became the law was introduced, the exception
for claims brought by members of the military had been omitted. 66
Because the accident at issue had "nothing to do with the [brothers']
army careers," their claims were viable under the FTCA. 67 The Court
did, however, state that "[w]ere the accident incident to the [brothers']
service, a wholly different case would [have been] presented. " 68
In 1950, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide that
"wholly different case" in Feres v. United States. 69 Feres addressed
59.
337 U.S . 49 (1949).
/d. at 50. "Leave" or "furlough" are the military terms used to describe
60.
approved vacation or "leave" time. The fact that the brothers were on furlough means
that they were not just off duty, but that they were also on approved leave.
/d.
61.
62 .
/d.
63.
/d. at 50- 51.
64.
/d. at 51. The Court further stated, regarding the fact that Congress had
servicemen in mind, that "[t]he overseas and combatant activities exceptions make this
plain." /d.
65.
/d.
66.
/d. at 51-52.
!d. at 52.
67.
68.
ld.
69.
340 u.s. 135 (1950).
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three cases that were factually similar: in each of the cases a member of
the armed forces suffered injuries by government employees while on
active duty and not while on leave, and two of the three cases
concerned negligent medical care. 70 The Court found that the fact that
the plaintiffs in Feres were on active duty and not leave at the time of
the injuries was a "vital distinction., because in Brooks the plaintiffs
were on leave and not under "orders or duty and on no military
mission. " 71 Pursuant to the Court's holding in Feres, the FTCA was not
a viable remedy "for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out
of or are in the course of activity incident to service. "72
The Court found unpersuasive that the statute already contained
enumerated exceptions (none of which were applicable to the facts
before it) and the fmal version of the FfCA did not contain an
exception for members of the service not injured during war, as did
sixteen of the prior versions. 73 The Court found that members of the
military already had a "comprehensive system of relief' and that "[t]he
primary purpose of the Act was to extend a remedy to those who had
been without," so the statute could not be read as creating yet another
avenue for members of the service to recover for their injuries. 74
Furthennore, reasoned the Court, members of the military had never
been allowed to sue the government, and allowing such lawsuits would
create causes of action Congress had not contemplated. 75 In considering
the broad language used in the Act, which suggested that there was not
a limit to the types of claims allowed if certain exceptions did not
apply, the Court found that the section in which the language was found
was merely jurisdictional and it remained for the courts to determine
which claims would be allowed. 76 Additionally, the Court held that
there existed a "distinctly federal" relationship between the government
and those in the armed forces, such that the relationship was governed
by federal, not state, law.77

70.
/d. at 137-38.
71.
/d. at 146.
72.
/d.
73.
!d. at 138-39.
74.
/d. at 140. The Court's fmding was seemingly consistent with other
courts' interpretations of other statutes waiving the federal government's immunity. See
geMralty Paul Figley, In Defense ofFeres: An Unfairly Maligned Opinion, 60 AM. U.
L. REv. 393, 446 (2010).
75.
Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-42.
76.
/d. at 140-41 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (Supp. lli 1950)).
77.
!d. at 143-44 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301,

305 (1947)).
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Three of the reasons justifying the Court's holding in Feres
became known as the "Feres rationales :m One rationale focused on the
relationship between the federal govenunent and members of the
military. 79 The reasoning behind this rationale was that because those in
the military are federal employees, federal law, and not state tort law,
should govern claims brought by these federal employees. 80 Another
rationale focused on the existing availability of benefits for those in the
military.81 If members of the military already had a system of benefits
that provided them with recovery, then there was no need for them to
bring claims under the FTCA. The final rationale articulated by the
Court in Feres focused on the fact that members of the military were
not allowed to sue the government prior to the enactment of the FTCA,
so Congress did not envision creating a new cause of action for
members of the military when it passed the FTCA. 82
Four years after the Court's enunciation of the rationales used to
support the decision in Feres. the Court seemingly introduced another
rationale: one grounded in "military discipline. "83 The Court provided
little elaboration regarding the basis for this rationale, but it stated that
the rationale was grounded in "[t]he peculiar and special relationship of
the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits
on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under
the [FTCA] were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts
committed in the course of military duty. " 84 The "military discipline"
rationale led to the rejection of the earlier rationale that was announced
in Feres: the belief that the FTCA did not create causes of action for
members of the military. 85 Pursuant to the new "military discipline"
rationale, courts were to ask whether the "suit require[d] the civilian
court to second-guess military decisions. "86 At one point, the Supreme
Court seemed to emphasize and prioritize this rationale over the other

78.
United States v. Johnson , 481 U.S. 681, 688-91 (1987).
Id. at 689.
79.
80.
/d.
81.
/d. at 689-90.
82.
Feres, 340 U.S. at 141- 42.
United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954).
83.
84.
/d.
85.
Johnson, 481 U.S. at 694-95 (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("In any event, [the
Court] subsequently recognized [its] error [in formulating this earlier rationale] and
rejected (it as a justification] .") .
United Stares v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
86.
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remaining two, 87 but it ultimately reiterated that the doctrine was
underpinned by all three of the rationales. 88
Other than articulating the three rationales, the Court has not
provided any other guidance as to when an injury occurs "incident to
service." The late Justice Scalia took all three of these rationales to task
in his dissent in United States v. Johnson .89 He argued that none of the
stated rationales "justifie[d the Court's] failure to apply the FTCA as
written" and that "Feres was wrongly decided and heartily deserve(d]
the 'widespread, almost universal criticism' it has received. " 90
Given the criticism of the rationales and the difficulty in applying
them, circuit courts began creating their own factors to consider when
determining whether the Feres doctrine applied to bar suits. 91 For
instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considers "1) where the
negligent act occurred[,] 2) the duty status of the plaintiff when the
negligent act occurred[,] 3) the benefits accruing to the plaintiff because
of his status as a service member[,] and 4) the nature of the plaintiff's
activities at the time the negligent act occurred. " 92 None of the factors
is dispositive, and the court will consider "the totality of the
circumstances. " 93 The Ninth Circuit noted that it has "reached the
unhappy conclusion that the cases applying the Feres doctrine are
irreconcilable," so when determining whether the doctrine applies, it
looks to cases with analogous fact patterns to determine if the doctrine
should be applied. 94
The Court has extended application of the doctrine to claims
brought by third parties when the third party's claim derived from an
injury that a member of the military sustained incident to service. 95 This

87.
/d. ("[T)he situs of the [tort) is not nearly as important as whether the suit
requires the civilian court to second-guess military decisions .. .. ").
Johnson , 481 U.S. at 688-91.
88.
89.
481 U.S. 681 (1987); id. at 692- 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
/d. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Product
90.
Liability Litigation, 580 Fed. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)).
91.
E.g. , Casto v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2001); accord
Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[T)he lower courts have found
the rationales other than discipline extremely difficult to apply in a coherent
manner .. .. ").
Costo, 248 F .3d at 867 (citations omitted); accord Wake v. United States,
92.
89 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 1996); Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1013 (5th Cir.
1980) (considering the military member's duty status, where the injury occurred, and
what the service member was doing at the time the injury occurred); see also Pierce v.
United States , 813 F.2d 349, 353 (11th Cir. 1987) (adopting the three-part Parker test).
93 .
Casto , 248 F .3d at 867 (citations omitted).
ld.
94.
95.
Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U .S. 666, 674 (1977).
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has become known as the "genesis" test. 96 Pursuant to this test, the
inquiry is whether the claim originated in an injury that occurred to a
member of the military incident to that member's service. 97 This test
has taken on a life of its own and has been applied to a number of
situations outside of the "garden-variety indemnification suit" from
which it originated. 98 For instance, it has been applied to bar claims
brought by the children and spouses of members of the military for
birth defects the children allegedly suffered as the result of inoculations
their fathers received during the Persian Gulf War. 99 Additionally, as is
discussed in more detail below, it has been applied to claims brought by
the children of service women.
Ill. THE PRE-BIRTH INJURY CASES

Until the 1970s, women who were in the United States military
and who chose to have children could be subject to discharge based on
their status as mothers. 100 Today, however, women who choose the
military as a career path are no longer automatically subject to
discharge because they are also mothers. 101 In the early cases involving
injuries sustained by pregnant female service members and their
children, the service member herself sought recovery. 102 The Feres
doctrine was, however, used to bar the claims brought by those female
service members, and courts did so primarily based on an application of
the three Feres rationales. For instance, in Atkinson v. United States, 103
a female service member brought a claim under the FTCA, arguing that
the military's failure to adequately diagnose and treat her symptoms,
96.
Ortiz v. United States ex ret. Evans Army Cmty. Hosp., 786 F.3d 817,
824 (lOth Cir. 2015) .
97 .
ld.
98 .
ld. at 823-24.
99.
Minns v. United States , 155 F.3d 445 , 446, 451 (4th Cir. 1998). See
generally Ortiz, 786 F.3d at 824 n.5 (citing other circuit courts that have applied the
genesis test outside of the indenmity context).
100. In 1951, President Truman signed Executive Order 10240, which
essentially allowed female service members to be discharged for having children or
assuming motherly duties. Exec. Order No. 10240, 3 C.P.R. 749 (1949-53).
101. The policy allowing for the discharge of pregnant women was challenged,
and some branches of the service started to abandon the policy by granting pregnant
soldiers waivers, but the official pronouncement on the policy' s constitutionality was
not until 1976 by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Crawford v. Cushman, 531
F.2d 1114, 1116 (2d Cir. 1976).
102. Irvin v. United States, 845 F.2d 126, 127 (6th Cir. 1988); Del Rio v.
United Stares, 833 F.2d 282, 284 (11th Cir. 1987); Atkinson v. United States, 825 F.2d
202, 203 (9th Cir. 1987).
103. 825 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1987).
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which were consistent with pre-eclampsia, resulted in the death of her
child, who was stillborn. 104 The government settled the claims for the
child's injuries, 105 but the female service member sought damages for
the physical and emotional injuries she allegedly suffered due to the
government's negligent care. 106
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court initially reversed the
district court's dismissal of the suit under the Feres doctrine. 107 In so
doing, the court relied on the application of the third Feres rationale
and ultimately found that "[t]he care provided a pregnant woman hardly
can be considered to be distinctively military in character" and that the
service woman's "injuries ha[d] nothing to do with her army career
'except in the sense that all human events depend upon what has
already transpired. "' 108 The Ninth Circuit then withdrew that opinion,
however, due to the United States Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Johnson, which clarified that all three of the Feres rationales
must be considered to determine if the doctrine bars the suit. The Ninth
Circuit ultimately held that the third Feres rationale did not support
dismissal of the female service member's claim, but it held, without
elaboration, that application of the other two rationales supported
dismissal. 109
In Irvin v. United States, uo the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
dismissed a claim by a female service member and her child for
negligent prenatal care after her child died shortly after it was born.u 1
The mother claimed that the military was negligent in "prescribing her
contraindicated medication," failing to correctly diagnose and treat her
pregnancy condition, and providing less than the acceptable standards
of care. 112 As was alleged in the complaint, these negligent acts led to
the baby's death four days after she was born. 113 The court quickly

104. Id. at 203.
105. As noted by the concurrence, "[t]bat the government did not invoke this
rule against Baby Atkinson [was] a tribute to its humanity but [did] little to mitigate the
harshness of the general rule." !d. at 207 (Noonan, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 203 n.l.
107. Atkinson v. United States, 804 F.2d 561, 561 (9th Cir. 1986), withdrawn,
825 F .2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1987).
108. Id. at 565 (quoting Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949)).
109. Atkinson, 825 F.2d at 206.
110. 845 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1988).
111. Id. at 130-31.
112. Id. at 127.
113. Id.
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found that the mother's claim was barred under the Feres doctrine
because she was on active duty at the time she suffered the injuries. 114
In Del Rio v. United States,115 a female service member argued
that her pregnancy and the treatment that she received as a result was
not incident to her service in the military. 116 Without providing any
meaningful discussion, the court disagreed: because the mother's
"active duty military status" allowed her to receive medical care at the
base medical facility, that "medical treatment . . . was incident to her
military service." 117 It was able to quickly dispense with the second
factor as well, fmding that she was entitled to care under the military's
no-fault compensation system. 118 Finally, regarding the third rationale,
the court found that because the mother's job in the Navy was as a
hospital corpsman, it "place[d] the discipline, supervision and control
of her working group at issue. "u9 No meaningful, in-depth review was
conducted, and that is the approach that continues today.
For example, in the most recent case involving a child's claim
under the FTCA for pre-birth injuries, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals reiterated that in determining whether the Feres doctrine
applied, the primary inquiry was "whether the injury was ' incident to
service. '" 120 The court admitted that the language "incident-to-service"
was "neither self-defining nor readily discernible from the language of
Feres or Johnson. " 121 Nevertheless, it found that the test applies very
broadly and "encompasses, at a minimum, all injuries suffered by
military personnel that are even remotely related to the individual's
status as a member of the military" and that "[p]ractically any suit that
implicates the military's judgments and decisions runs the risk of
colliding with Feres. " 122 Thus, the court found that the three Feres
rationales "effectively merged . . . with the incident to service test,"
and it would apply that test as it was first articulated in Feres. 123

114.
115.

116.

/d. at 130.
833 F.2d 282 (11th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 286.

117. !d.
118. ld.
119. !d.
120. Oniz v. United States ex rei. Evans Anny Cmty. Hosp., 786 F.3d 817,
821 - 22 ( lOth Cir. 2015).
121. !d. at 820-21.
122. !d. at 821 (quoting Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1223-24
(lOth C ir. 2003)).
123. Id. at 822-23 (quoting Ricks v. Nickels , 295 F .3d 1124, 1130 (lOth Cir.

2002)).
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As a result of the courts' unwillingness to fully consider whether
the claim should be barred, at the end of the 1980s it was clear that a
female service member's claims for injuries she sustained during
pregnancy were going to be barred by the Feres doctrine. Whether her
child would be able to state a claim was (and still is) wholly dependent
on where the injury occurred and the approach taken by the federal
court in that jurisdiction. Regarding the claims brought by the service
women's children, three approaches have been taken. The first
approach involves an application of the Feres rationales, and in the ftrst
cases addressing this issue, courts turned to those rationales to
determine if the child's claim should be barred under an application of
the rationales, which led the courts to reach inconsistent results. 124 The
Fourth and Sixth Circuits use what has been termed the
"treatment-focused" approach, which focuses on whether the treatment
was directed at the child or the mother. 125 If the "sole purpose" of the
treatment was to benefit the child, the Feres doctrine is found to not be
applicable and will not bar the child's claim. 126
In Ortiz v.

Hospital,

United States ex rei. Evans Army Community

127

the Tenth Circuit rejected the "treatment-focused" approach
and applied the "injury-focused" approach and held that a child's claim
for injuries sustained pre-birth was barred under the FTCA because her
mother, a captain in the Air Force, suffered an injury during the
124. Compare Scales v. United States , 685 F.2d 970, 973-74 (5th Cir. 1982),
and Irvin v. United States, 845 F.2d 126, 130-31 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying the Peres
rationales and finding that the children's claims were barred), with Del Rio, 833 F.2d at
287-88 (applying the Feres rationales and finding that the child's claim was not
barred).
125.

Brown v. United States, 462 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 2006); Romero v.
United States , 954 F.2d 223, 226 (4th Cir. 1992). In order to reconcile its holding with
its earlier, seemingly contrary holding in Irvin, in Brown the Sixth Circuit held that it

was "not convinced that the end result of (the] analysis require(d] slavish adherence to
Irvin," because the facts were distinguishable and because the opinion in Irvin "rest[ed]
on shaky ground." Brown, 462 F.3d at 614. According to the court in Brown, Irvin
rested on "shaky ground" because the language it relied on was, allegedly, dictum from
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Scales. /d. at 614 (citations omitted).
126. E.g., Romero, 954 F.2d at 225. Other approaches have been proposed.
For instance, in a case where the child's injuries were allegedly caused by the military's
failure to follow the pregnant service member's pregnancy plan, one judge suggested
that the Feres doctrine should not be applied in situations where the military failed to
follow its own policies and regulations. Ritchie v. United States, 733 F.3d 871, 879
(9th Cir. 2013) (Nelson, J., concurring), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2135 (2014). Another
judicial approach that has been suggested is to focus on the military's conduct toward
the service member, and if that conduct toward the service member would be barred by
the Feres doctrine, so too would the claim brought by the third party. Ortiz, 786 F.3d
at 834 (Ebel, J. , concurring).
127. 786 F.3d 817 (lOth Cir. 2015).
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delivery, even though the mother was not bringing a claim for any
injury she herself sustained. 128 The "injury-focused" approach "asks
flrst whether there was an incident-to-service injury to the service
member." 129 If that question is answered in the affirmative, then the
inquiry focuses on "whether the injury to the third party was derivative
of that injury. " 130 Both questions have to be answered in the affirmative
for the Feres doctrine to apply. 131 The plaintiffs in Ortiz are currently
seeking review by the Supreme Court, 132 but prior to the Tenth
Circuit's opinion in Ortiz, the Supreme Court had been asked to
address the issue regarding the application of the Feres doctrine to
cases involving pregnant service members and their children on four
occasions and denied certiorari each time. 133
IV. RIGHTING THE WRONGS
Even though the Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he Feres
doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules," 134 that is exactly
what has happened to claims brought by service women for injuries
sustained during their pregnancies. 135 Thus, under the mistaken
perception that sovereign immunity has no limits, tethers, or
boundaries, the Feres doctrine has been applied to bar the claims
brought by female service members injured as a result of military
medical malpractice without any meaningful inquiry as to whether the
rationales underpinning the existence of the doctrine are implicated by
the lawsuit.
As a result, potentially viable claims, like the claim at issue in
Atkinson, have been dismissed, and the courts have engaged in

128. Id. at 828.
129. /d. at 825 . The court found that the "treatment-focused" approach could
lead to strange results because it could be difficult to ascertain whether the treatment
was to benefit the mother, the child, or both. Jd. at 830.
130. /d. at 825.
131. ld.
132. Ortiz, 786 F .3d 817, appeal ckJcketed, No. 15-488 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2015).
133. Ritchie v. United States, 733 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2013) , cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 2135 (2014); Irvin v. United States, 845 F .2d 126 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S . 975 (1988); Atkinson v. United States , 825 F .2d 202 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988); Scales v. United States , 685 F .2d 970 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S . 1082 (1983).
134. Shearer v. United States, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) .
135. As noted by Judge Ferguson in Costo v. United States, "the ' incident to
service' test appears to have given way to an ' incidental to service' inquiry, further
distorting Congress's original language in the FTCA." 248 F.3d 863, 870 n.l (9th Cir.
2001) (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
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numerous forms of legal gymnastics to determine if a child's claim for
injuries sustained pre-birth should be barred just because the child's
mother happens to be a member of the military. As discussed above,
this has led to unfairness and inconsistency in the way the doctrine has
been applied to the claims brought by the children of service women. It
has, however, also led to unfairness between other military
constituents. For example, as the Feres doctrine is currently applied in
the pre-birth cases, only a female service woman's claim is barred. Put
more simply, a male service member whose wife is not in the military
may bring a claim under the FTCA for damages sustained if his wife or
their child is injured during the pregnancy and, likewise, so may his
wife and child. 136
On a broader scale, it has led to unfairness between civilians and
members of the military because "[t]he doctrine effectively declares
that members of the United States military are not equal citizens, as
their rights against their govermnent are less than the rights of their
fellow Americans. " 137 For example, even though the same rationales
underpinning the doctrine may be implicated in claims for medical
malpractice by civilians, civilians are allowed to bring those claims.
Thus, the unbridled application of sovereign immunity through the
Feres doctrine raises constitutional arguments that are beyond the scope
of this essay but that are nevertheless present and cannot be ignored.
The Feres doctrine applies to a wider variety of cases than just
those involving claims for injuries that occur during pregnancy, and
whether members of the military should be barred from bringing claims
under the FTCA is a far-reaching policy determination that should be
left for Congress. Congress is aware of the unfairness that is currently
caused by the application of the Feres doctrine, particularly in the area
of medical malpractice. In the 1980s and early 1990s, it attempted to
rectify the unfairness caused by the doctrine' s application in cases
involving medical malpractice, but all attempts failed. 138

136. Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976, 978-79 (D.R.I. 1987)
(involving a claim under the FTCA brought by a male member of the service, his wife,
who was not in the service, and their infant daughter, who suffered extreme injuries
prior to her birth), ajJ'd in part, 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1988).
137. Costo , 248 F.3d at 870 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
138. H.R. 3407, 102d Cong. (1991-92) (introduced and reported to the
Committee on the Judiciary); H.R. 1054, lOOth Cong. (1987- 88) (passed the House
with a vote of 312 to 61); H.R. 3174, 99th Cong. (1985- 86) (passed the House with a
vote of317 to 90); H.R. 1943, 98th Cong. (1983- 84).
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In 2009, another attempt was made: the Carmelo Rodriquez
Military Medical Accountability . Act. 139 The proposed legislation was
triggered by a tragedy in which the diagnosis of a young service
member's malignant melanoma was never fully explained to him or
treated by military doctors, which ultimately caused his very untimely
death. 140 The legislation would have allowed a service member to bring
a claim "arising out of a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the
performance of medical, dental, or related health care functions." 141
Despite the bill's good intentions, it did not survive contact with its
many enemies. It received a favorable recommendation from the House
Committee on the Judiciary, but opponents of the bill were concerned
that it would "not make any significant contribution towards improving
the quality of military medicine and [would] undermine military morale
and effectiveness. " 142 As a result, nothing was done. Congress should,
however, reassert itself in this area. Its failure to do so has led to a
regime where the courts have been left to implement a policy that has
never been articulated by Congress and has led to unfairness between
members of the military and between members of the military and the
general public. That cannot be what Congress intended when passing
the FTCA.
In the event that Congress maintains the status quo-which is,
unfortunately, a likely scenario-courts should acknowledge that the
current application of the Peres doctrine parrots the Court's
jurisprudence regarding the vast reach of federal sovereign immunity:
that the federal government is immune from suit regardless of whether
the lawsuit implicates government policy decisions. In acknowledging
this fact, courts should conduct a meaningful inquiry regarding whether
the lawsuit actually runs afoul of any of the policy rationales relied on
to invoke the protection of the Peres doctrine. 143 In cases involving
139. H.R. 1478, lllth Cong. § 268I(a) (2009); S. 1347, lllth Cong.
§ 2681(a) (2009).
140. See generally Melissa Feldmeier, Comment, At War with the Feres
Doctrine: The Carmela Rodriquez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009, 60
CATH. U. L. REv. 145, 164-65 n.l41 (2010); Kenneth R. Wiltberger, Note, The

Carmela Rodriquez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009: An Opportunity to
Overturn the Feres Doctrine as It Applies to Military Medical Malpractice , 8 AVE
MARJA L. REv. 473, 473- 74 (2010).
141. H.R. 1478; S. 1347.
142. H.R. Rep. No. 111-466, at 20 (2010).
143. A number of scholars have called for the demise of the Feres doctrine and
a number of alternatives have been suggested in cases not specifically involving injuries
that involve pregnant women and their children. E.g., Patrick J. Austin, Incident to
Service: Analysis of the Feres Doctrine and Its Overly Broad Application to Service
Members Injured IJy Negligent Acts Beyond the Battlefield, 14 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 18
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pre-birth injuries, the four-part test used in some jurisdictions does not
go far enough in ensuring that the doctrine is applied fairly.
Instead, in these types of cases, courts should find that injuries
suffered by service women pre-birth cannot be determined to occur
"incident to servic~. " As discussed in my earlier essay, at the time the
Court formulated the "incident to service" test, women were subject to
discharge for any reason, and pregnancy has never been considered part
of the military's mission. 144 To the contrary, the concept of motherhood
has always been recognized by the military as something specific to
women. If a woman becomes pregnant on active duty, she may seek a
voluntary separation because of the pregnancy. 145 Upon confirmation of
pregnancy, the military may impose restrictions on a pregnant service
member's ability to change her duty station during the duration of the
pregnancy and for a short time thereafter. 146 Likewise, pregnant service
(2014); Bahdi, supra note 48, at 67; Peggy L . Miller, An Ounce of Immunity Prevents
a Pound of Lawsuils: Medical Malpractice and Military Mothers, 70 U. DET. MERCY
L. REv. 327, 328 (1993) (arguing that in determining whether immunity exists, one
should focus on the actor, not the victim); Thomas M . Gallagher, Note,
Servicemembers' RighJs Under the Feres Doctrine: Rethinking 'Incident to Service'
Analysis, 33 VILL. L. REv. 175, 199-203 (1988) (arguing that, in determining whether
an injury occurred "incident to service,"' courts should focus on whether military
decisions will be questioned in the lawsuit and whether the lawsuit will have a negative
impact on military discipline); Geoffrey G. Leder, Note, The Feres Doctrine, Negligent
Prenatal Care, and Injuries to the Children of Pregnant Military Servicewomen: Brown
v. United States, 76. U. CIN. L. REv. 1043, 1065-66 (2008) (arguing that, in
determining whether the child's claims are barred, the courts should focus only on the
Feres rationales and not ask whether the injury derived from an injury to the service
woman).
144. Willke, supra note lO, at 166.
145. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 36-3208 para.
3.17 (2004) ("Women may fmd pregnancy and the expectation of motherhood
incompatible with continued military service [and,) [i]f so, they may ask for
separation.").
146. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 36-2110 para.
2.39 (2009); see U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 614-30 para. 5-3 (2015).
Commanders have also had to take seemingly drastic measures regarding pregnancy to
ensure unit readiness. For instance, on November 4, 2009, the commanding officer in
Iraq instituted a policy that provided for the court martial of soldiers, both male and
female , if a female soldier became pregnant while serving under his command. See
Sarah Netter & Louis Martinez, Senators Demand General Rescind Order on Pregnant
Soldiers, ABC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/general-backs-offthreat-court-martial-pregnant-soldiers/story?id=9399604. Major General Cucolo, the
officer who instituted the policy, stated tbat the reason be instituted the policy was
because the loss of the female soldiers, who would have to return stateside after
becoming pregnant, would leave the unit weaker. See General: No Court Martial for
Pregnant Soldiers, NBCNEws.coM (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
34524436/ns/us_ news-military/t/general-no-court-martial-pregnant-soldiers/. He also
stated that while some soldiers had been reprimanded for violating the policy, none had
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members may have their regular work duties altered during their
pregnancy. 147
Furthermore, courts are well equipped to address this issue when a
similar suit is brought by a civilian, so it should not be automatically
presupposed that just because a plaintiff is a member of the armed
forces, the court will have to delve into sensitive military matters based
on that fact alone. 148 In short, an acknowledgement that the reaches of
federal sovereign immunity have been stretched to unreasonable limits
wi11 help the courts addressing these cases reach the conclusion that
pregnancy and any injuries incident thereto do not occur "incident to
service" and are not barred by the Feres doctrine. If the mother's claim
is not barred, then her child's claim will not be barred, so the issue
regarding whether the child has a claim will be addressed through a
finding that the mother's claim is not barred.
CONCLUSION

The mistaken belief that federal sovereign immunity provides the
government with blanket immunity from suit unless it consents has
crept into the application of the Feres doctrine, at least as that doctrine
has been applied to the claims brought by service women for injuries
sustained pre-birth. This has created a far-reaching policy under which
.these service members may be barred from bringing claims under the
FTCA if the injury occurred when they were in the military, regardless
of the tenuous connection between the injury and the service member's
military duties. The pre-birth injury cases also illustrate how far this
policy has been taken and its harsh ramifications. Congress simply
could not have intended to create this kind of unfairness when it passed
the FTCA, and it should address the matter and clearly specify its
intent. Alternatively, it is time for courts to acknowledge that the

been court martialed and he did not foresee any being court martialed for violating the
policy. Id.
147. E.g. , U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, AJR FORCE INSTRUCTION 10-203
para. 3.5 (2014); U.S. DEP'TOF ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 40-501 para. 7-9 (2011).
148. Krent, supra note 13, at 1532- 33 ("Government actions that are
situation-specific, such as physician malpractice, rarely stem from previously set
policy" and "[i]mmunizing such acts from tort suits may not force the government to
internalize the costs of its actions, which, in turn, may lead to inefficient governance in
the future. "); Sisk, supra note 13, at 562 ("It is quite another thing to allow the canon
of strict construction to devolve into a methodology by which the government wins
automatically whenever plausible arguments can be made for alternative interpretations
of a statutory provision that sets forth standards, limitations, exceptions, or procedural
rules for claims against the government already authorized by an express waiver.") .
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doctrine of sovereign immunity, as it is applied today , rests on very
unsettled ground and that there are solid reasons for reining it back in.

